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Revolutions among Latin-American peoples have become matters
of such common occurrence that ordinarily they attract little or no
attention from the outside world. Yet such is not the case with the
recent and expected revolution upon the Isthmus of Panama. The
reason for this is not because of its proportions, but rather because
of its relation to the construction of the Panama Canal, and the
legal questions which it raises. The revolted territory occupies a
commanding position as the gateway between the two great oceans.
It is this position which gives to it international importance. With
countries as with persons, importance to the world arises not from
size but from the possession of something of which the world needs.
This revolution is unlike the average Latin-American revolution
of recent years, in that it has adequate justification. The interests
of the people of the Isthmus were being senselessly sacrificed to
th greed of a ring of unprincipled, blundering politicians from
the oppressive effects of whose selfish, shortsighted policy they
could see no hope of relief except by a severance of political relations.
Political unity is but a means to an end-the promotion of human
welfare-and when it fails to meet this end it has outlived its
usefulness.
But the question which concerns us more immediately is the
justification of the United States for recognizing the organized
community in the revolted district as a de facto government, within
a few days after their own proclamation of independence. As might
be expected, the action of our government has led to no small
amount of adverse criticism, both at home and abroad, though by
far the greater part of it is at home. It is therefore fitting that
we examine it soberly in the light of international law.
While the recognition of a de facto government may be the
expression of a wish, it is in law the recognition of a fact. This
fact is the existence of a politically organized community having
an established seat of government, enforcing obedience to its man-
dates within its territorial limits in a civilized and orderly manner,
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and asserting its independence, with a reasonable chance of being
able to make good its assertion. This does not mean that in case
it has hitherto formed a part of another state, all resistance upon
the part of the parent state shall have ceased, but that it is reasonably
sure that the revolted section will be able to successfully resist
such restraining force as said parent state can and will exert in
maintaining over them its alleged sovereignty. In other words, the
community seeking recognition as a de facto government should
have something more than an even chance to live, although the
permanency of its existence need not be established beyond all
peradventure.
When such a condition of affairs exist, the claimant has, under
international law, a right to recognition and other states are not
justified in refusing it recognition. But as to the existence of the
facts.each state must be its own judge, and, provided it acts in good
faith, neither recognition nor the withholding of it is any just cause
of complaint, however much its judgment may differ from that
of other states. If, however, a state acts in bad faith and extends
recognition for the purpose of encouraging resistance to the parent
state, such recognition ceases to be the rightful act of a neutral
and becomes interference, which might justly be considered as a
casus belli. An illustration of this was the recognition of the inde-
pendence of the United States by France and Holland in 1778,
which resulted in a declaration of war against both of them by
England.
Though recognition does not create a state, it is nevertheless
important evidence that a state has been created. Sir James
McIntosh and Canning, England's greatest diplomat, have attempted
to make a distinction between recognition by the parent state and
recognition by other states. To quote the language of the former:
"The two senses in which the word recognition is used when applied
to the act of the mother country, and when applied to that of third
powers are so different as to have nothing very important in
common." Canning endorses this view. But the distinction will
not hold, for both are simply evidence as to the existence of a
fact, and while one may be more conclusive than the other the
difference is clearly one of degree rather than of kind.
Perhaps the best statement of the rule is that of John Quincy
Adams, quoted with approval by Wharton in his Digest of the
International Law, and by Sir William Hall in his most excellent
treatise on International Law. "There is a stage in revolutionary
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contests when the party struggling for independence has, I conceive,
a right to demand its acknowledgment by neutral parties, and when
the acknowledgment may be granted without departure from the
obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when independence is
established as a matter of fact, so as to leave the chance of the
opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate. The
neutral nation, must, of course, judge for itself when this period
has arrived; and as the belligerent nation has the same right to
judge for itself, it is very likely to judge differently from the
neutral, and to make it a cause or pretext for war, as Great Britain
did expressly against France in our revolution, and substantially
against Holland. If war results in point of fact from the measure
of recognizing a contested independence, the moral right or wrong
of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence
with which the recognizing nation took the step."
The length of time during which the revolution has been going
on is manifestly a matter of indifference, so long as the necessary
results have been accomplished. And in the present case it would
seem that the withdrawal of the government forces from the Isthmus,
leaving the revolutionists in complete control, was a virtual recog-
nition of their sovereignty by the Colombian government itself,
which, coupled with the fact that there is no apparent likelihood
that said decadent government will ever be able to re-establish its
sovereignty over its revolted subjects, furnishes ample justification
for recognition by the United States of the existence of a de facto
and also of a de jure government.
In addition to the question of our duty as a neutral state there
is raised the legal question of our obligations under the Treaty of
Dec. 12, 1846, with New Granada. After providing for "most
favored nation" treatment with reference to the commerce of the
respective countries, reciprocity with regard to tonnage dues and
drawbacks, and freedom of transit across the Isthmus to the com-
merce and citizens of the United States, there is the following
provision: "And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil
and constant enjoyment of these advantages and as an especial
compensation for the said advantages and for the favors they have
acquired by the 4 th, 5th and 6th articles of this treaty. The United
States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by
the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned
Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the
other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time
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while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and prop-
erty which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory."
The fact that New Granada no longer exists does not affect
our obligations under the treaty, as it is a well established rule of
international law that a change of name by a state does not affect
its treaty rights or obligations. This treaty is still in force and we
have in accordance with its provisions, sometimes at the request of
the Colombian government and sometimes upon our own initiative,
used force, to maintain the free transit of the Isthmus. And in so
doing we have performed a valuable service to Colombia, to the
world and to our own citizens. Until the treaty is abrogated, there
is no question as to our legal or moral right to protect and enforce
freedom of transit on the Isthmus whether by rail or any other
means of transportation.
But the question has been raised as to our obligation to protect
the sovereignty of Colombia against revolution by her own citizens.
The terms of the treaty give some color to the view of those who
hold that we are under such obligation. The question is one of
interpretation. And in interpreting a treaty, as in interpreting a
contract between individuals, we must look to the intention of the
parties; for a treaty is nothing but a contract to which independent
states are parties. In arriving at the intention of the parties, we
must take into account the circumstances existing at the time
the contract was made and with reference to which both the parties
contracted. In the present case there can be no doubt as to the
purpose of entering into the treaty. The intention of the parties
was clearly not to protect the Colombian sovereignty against the
people of the Isthmus, but rather to guarantee it against inter-
ference upon the part of European powers from whom there was
at that time reason to apprehend danger. The United States has
never entered into a treaty for the purpose of compelling a people
to submit to a sovereignty which disregarded their welfare, nor is
there any evidence that at the time the treaty was entered into the
other party to it intended that we should ever be called upon to
protect their sovereignty against anything except outside inter-
ference. Hence, though the literal terms of the treaty would give
us authority to use force if necessary in order to prevent the people
of the Isthmus from establishing their sovereignty over it, such a
construction would undoubtedly do violence to the spirit of the
treaty.
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An excellent precedent for construing a treaty according to the
spirit rather than the letter is the case of the Treaty of Utrecht,
cited by Phillimore for this purpose. According to the provisions
of the treaty, France was to destroy the fortifications of Dunkirk
and never to rebuild them. She complied with her treaty engage-
ments by destroying the fortifications of the port of Dunkirk, but
immediately began the forming and fortifying of the port of Mar-
dyck, scarcely a league away. England protested against such an
evasion of the treaty and France finally admitted that her inter-
pretation, though not precluded by the letter of the treaty, was
unsound.
The recognition of a new state created by revolution against
the parent state is always more or less of a delicate nature and
very likely to excite opposition unless it follows a formal recognition
by said parent state. But the recognition of the New Republic of
Panama by the United States has contravened no principle of inter-
national law, and the conduct of our government, for which
Secretary Hay is largely responsible, has throughout the proceedings
been characterized by frankness, tact, and a statesmanlike grasp of
the situation. Edwin Maxey.
